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Child Pornography's Forgotten Victims
Audrey Rogers*
State legislatures>and Congress have enacted many laws to
protect children from becoming victims of sex crimes. Yet, chil-
dren live in an increasingly dangerous world attributable in
part to the explosive growth of the Internet. In particular, the
Internet has dramatically increased access to child pornogra-
phy. With just a couple of clicks of the mouse and a few strokes
of the keyboard, a person can find any type of picture, including
graphic images of children being tortured and raped. Neverthe-
less, some judges, scholars and members of the public at large
treat possession of child pornography as a victimless crime.
This paper examines this phenomenon.
The Supreme Court has carved out child pornography from
First Amendment protections because children are harmed in
all aspects of its production, dissemination and possession.
While there is little serious debate over the harm producers and
distributors inflict on children, this view does not always extend
to possessors of images. For example, following the demise of
mandatory sentencing under the federal guidelines in United
States v. Booker,! a number of United States federal district
court judges have deviated substantially from the guidelines in
sentencing possessors of child pornography on the ground that
it is a victimless crime? One federal circuit court treats the
children depicted in pornographic images as merely secondary
* Associate Professor of Law, Pace Law School.
1. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
2. 18 U.s.C. § 2252(b)(2) (1999) provides that a person who possesses or at-
tempts to possess child pornography "shall be fmed or . . . imprisoned not more
than 10 years. or both ...." In contrast, the statute provides for minimum
sentences of no less than five years for transporting, receiving, distributing or pos-
sessing with the intent to sell child pornography. 18 U.s.C. § 2252(b)(I) (1999).
The producer of child pornography is subject to a statutory minimum imprison-
ment of fifteen years. 18 U.S.C. § 2251(e) (1999). The United States Sentencing
Guidelines provide a framework for calculating the appropriate sentence within
the statutory range.. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANuAL § 2G2.2
(2007).
847
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victims, and many states impose lenient sentences on posses-
sors of child pornography.
The goal of this paper is to demonstrate that possession of
child pornography is not a victimless crime. It will illustrate
the problem and explain the harm suffered by its victims.3 It
will then trace factors that may have contributed to the percep-
tion that possession of child pornography is a victimless offense.
The first factor is the dual nature of the child pornography laws
that addresses both actual and future harm. When this duality
is applied to possessors, their link to actual harm appears at-
tenuated because the possessor is not involved in the acts of
sexual abuse inherent in producing the images. The second fac-
tor is that a number of scholars have criticized generally posses-
sion offenses as a tool for preemptive prosecutions, but they
have not exempted child pornography from their condemnation.
Finally, technology itself is a cause. The growth of the Internet
and the ability to find images from the comfort of one's home
further weakens the connection between the victim and the
viewer; this distance is exacerbated by a general sense that
nothing is real in cyberspace.
1. Evidence of the Problem
Congress and all states outlaw the possession of child por-
nography. Yet, judicial treatment of those convicted of posses-
sion of child pornography reveals a perception by some courts
that it is a victimless crime, as the following examples illus-
trate. Stefan Goff, a fifty-four-year-old elementary school
teacher appeared to be "a respectable, middle-aged man leading
a decent, law abiding life."4 However, his computer told a dif-
ferent story. It held 360 different pornographic images of chil-
dren. Some showed an adult performing oral sex on a pre-
pubescent girl, and others showed children being raped and mo-
lested. Yet, his attorney claimed that this was a victimless
crime that did not warrant serious punishment.5 The district
3. It is this perception, not the specific sentence the courts imposed, that is
problematic. Thus, this paper's goal is not to recommend longer sentences; rather,
it is to ensure that sentences accurately reflect that those who possess child por-
nography hurt real victims. •
4. United States v. Goff, 501 F.3d 250, 251 (3d Cir. 2007).
5. ld. at 253.
2008] CHILD PORNOGRAPHY'S FORGOTTEN VICTIMS 849
court agreed, sentencing Goff to four months' imprisonment, far
less than the Sentencing Guidelines' suggested minimum sen-
tence of twenty-one months.6 In rejecting the prosecutor's posi-
tion that possession of child pornography was a serious offense"
the district court, during sentencing proceedings, stated: "'[It's]
truly a psychological crime. It is not a taking crime.... Almost
one might say a psychiatric crime.'''7
Bruce Pugh pled guilty to possessing'sixty-eight images of
child pornography, including images of an infant being raped by
an adult and an eight-year old girl performing oral sex on an
adult male.s The district court ruled that the defendant's pos-
session was "passive and incidental" to his goal of meeting peo-
ple online and sentenced him to five years probation."
Similarly, the defendant in United States v. Goldberg
'
°received
a one-day sentence for possessing images oftwo- and three-year
olds being raped. In support of this sentence, the district court
stated that the "defendant was not a real deviant becaus~he
had committed the crime out of 'boredom and stupidity.'''''
Even federal circuit courts are not exempt from the view
that possession is a victimless offense. A pre-Booker split devel-
oped among the circuits concerning whether, for the purposes of
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, they should group as one
the multiple counts ofpossession ofchild pornography.'2 If they
are not grouped, multiple counts of possession would increase
the severity of the sentence. The Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines state that multiple "counts involving substantially the
same harm shall be grouped together into a single groUp."13
Whether the counts involve "substantially the same harm" de-
6. ld. Goff was also sentenced to three years' supervised release and a
$10,000 fine.
7. ld.
8. United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179 (11th Cir. 2008).
9. ld. at 1187.
10. 491 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 2007).
11. ld. at 671. See also United States v. Polito, 2 No. 06-30133, 2007 WL
313463 (5th Cir. Jan. 31, 2007) (one year house arrest and five years' probation);
United States v. Peterson, No. 03-2078, 2003 WL 22952189 (8th Cir. Dec. 15, 2003)
(six months' house arrest and three years' probation).
12. Compare United States v. Toler, 901 F.2d 399 (4th Cir. 1990) with United
States v. Sherman, 268 F.3d 539 (7th Cir. 2001), United States v. Norris, 159 F.3d
926 (5th Cir. 1998), and United States v. Boos, 127 F.3d 1207 (9th Cir. 1997).
13. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANuAL §3D1.2(d) (2007).
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pends on whether they involve the same primary victim." The
Commentary to the Guidelines notes that in most cases there is
an identifiable victim-the "one person who is directly and most
seriously affected by the offense."15 It further provides that if
the victim cannot be identified, the primary victim for the pur-
poses of grouping. is "society in general." The Commentary
specifies that crimes where society is the victim are "victimless"
crimes. '6
The Fourth Circuit, in United States u. Toler,17 held that
the primary victim in child pornography offenses is society in
general, not the specific child depicted. IS It placed the offense in
the category of victimless crimes by reasoning that trafficking
in child pornography harms the "moral fabric of society at
large."'9 Thus, the Toler court focused on the future harm that
could be inflicted on children if the market for child pornogra-
phy is not dried up, rather than on the particular child being
depicted."o
Post-Toler appellate courts have rejected its reasoning.by
focusing on the actual harm inflicted on the children portrayed
in pornographic images. As the Ninth Circuit stated, the crea-
tion and distribution of child pornography creates a "permanent
record of the children's participation and the harm to the child
is exacerbated by their circulation."21 Child pornography is
therefore different than crimes such as drug and immigration
offenses, where the harm is spread evenly throughout society."2
According to all the circuits that addressed the issue (except the
Fourth Circuit), this direct victimization theory rationale ap-
14. Id. § 3D1.2(b).
15. Id. cmt. 2.
16. Id.
17. 901 F.2d 399 (4th Cir. 1990).
18. In Toler, the defendant was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 2423 (2006)
(interstate transportation ofa milior with the intent to engage in prohibited sexual
conduct) aud 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(I) (2006) (interstate transportation of child por-
nography) after he traveled across state lines with his twelve-year-old stepdaugh-
ter and transported pornographic photos of her. The Fourth Circuit held that the
lower court properly refused to group the offenses because the child was the victim
of the section 2423 offense, but society was the victim of the section 2251 offense.
Toler, 901 F.2d at 402-03.
19. Id. at 403.
20. Id.
21. Uuited States v. Boos, 127 F.3d 1207 (9th Cir. 1997).
22. Id.at 1211.
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plies equally to those who possess, receive, transport and dis-
tribute child pornography.23 While the Sentencing Guidelines
are no longer mandatory, the grouping issue is still significant
because of the post-Booker rulings that require federal courts to
begin their calculation of a defendant's sentence according to
the guidelines and" then explain how deviations are
reasonable.24
Similar to the circuit courts' rejection of Toler, appellate
courts vacated Goff, Pugh, and Goldberg's sentences in opinions
that chastised the lower court judges for failing to properly take
the seriousness of the offenses into account.25 For example, the
Third Circuit in Goff stressed that the defendant's activities in
front of his computer screen were not "solitary" activities in an
online fantasy world.26 Noting that "children are exploited,
raped and molested for the prurient pleasure of Goff and others
who support suppliers of child pornography," it found that this
was not a theoretical crime with no victims.27
In light of these reversals, we could ask whether the illus-
trated cases are mere aberrations. While it may be easy to dis-
miss them as such, there are other indications that they reflect
a deeper societal view that possession is a victimless crime. In
fact, the defendants convicted of possessing child pornography
in state courts appeared before similarly sympathetic judges.
For example, a Connecticut Superior Court judge rejected an
agreement worked out by defense attorneys and prosecutors
that called for four years' imprisonment for the defendant's pos-
session of 141 images and two videotapes of toddlers and pre-
pubescent children being abused. Instead, the judge granted
defendant a suspended sentence.28 This perception that posses-
23. See, e.g., United States v. Sherman, 268 F.3d 539 (7th Cir. 2001); see also
United States v. Norris, 159 F.3d 926 (5th Cir. 1998); Boos, 127 F.3d 1207.
24. Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586 (2007); Rita v. United States, 127 S.
Ct. 2456 (2007).
25. See United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179 (11th Cir. 2008); United States
v. Goff, 501 F.3d 250 (3d Cir. 2007); United States v. Goldberg, 491 F.3d 668 (7th
Cir. 2007).
26. Goff, 501 F.3d at 258.
27. ld. at 259.
28. See Associated Press, Connecticut Judge Lets Child Porn Defendant Walk,
No Jail Time, FOXNEWS.COM, Oct. 10,2006, http://www.foxnews.comlstory/0.2933.
219159,00.html. See also Dan Herberk, Child Porn: State Goes Easy on Child Porn
Offenders, COMPUTER CRIME RESEARCH eTR., October 19, 2005, http://www.crimeR
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sion is a victimless crime is not limited to the United States.
According to a 2006 survey of 184 Interpol member countries,
136 of these countries did not even criminalize the possession of
child pornography.29
We cannot rely on the appellate courts to fix inappropriate
sentences since their powers have been reined in by the recent
Supreme Court decision in Gall v. United States,"o which man-
dates that appellate courts apply a highly deferential abuse of
discretion standard in reviewing federal sentences. The Su~
preme Court has already granted certiorari and vacated appel-
late court reversals of insubstantial possession sentences with
instructions to review them in light of Gall.3! Thus, now, more
than ever, it is essential that we dispel the perception that pos-
session of child pornography is a victimless crime.
II. The Damage Caused by Child Pornography
Even with their eventual reversals, cases such as Goff and
Pugh exemplify the continuing misperception that possession of
child pornography is a victimless crime. If federal and state
court judges hold these misperceptions, undoubtedly others are
similarly misguided. In fact, statistics show the real damage
caused by child pornography. A 2005 study of child pornogra-
phy possessors, conducted by the National Center for Missing
and Exploited Children, found that more than eighty percent of
arrested child pornography possessors had images of
prepubescent children, and eighty percent had images of chil-
dren being sexually penetrated.32 Twenty percent of the defend-
research.org/analytics/child-porn-offenders; Ed Hynes, Man Gets Two Months in
Jail for 44 Counts ofChild Pornography, in A View From Riverside Drive, OBSCENI-
TYCRIMES.ORG, June, 2008, http://www.obscenitycrimes.org/news/vfrd0606.cfm.
29. See INT'L CTR. FOR MISSING & EXPLOITED CHILDREN, CHILD PORNOGRAPHY:
MODEL LEGISLATION & GLOBAL REVIEW (2006), available at http://www.missing
kids.com/en_US/documents/CP_Legislation_Report.pdf.
30. 128 S. Ct. 586 (2007).
31. See, e.g., United States v. Duhon, 440 F.3d 711 (5th Cir. 2006), vacated,
128 S. Ct. 853 (2008) (five months' probation for images including rape of an 8-year
old): United States v. Grinsberg, 470 F.3d 758 (8th Cir. 2006), vacated, 128 S. Ct.
859 (2008) (366 day sentence for 300 images, including prepubescent children).
32. Janis Wolak et aI., Child-Pornography Possessors Arrested in Internet~Re­
lated Crimes: Findings from the National Juvenile Online Victimization Study;
NATL eTR. FOR MISSING AND EXPLOITED CHILDREN, 2005, available at http://www.
missingkids.com/en.-U S/publicationsINC144.pdf.
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ants had images of children enduring sadistic sex and
bondage," and thirty-nine percent had videos of children being
abused. 34 Thus, the vast majority of possessors of child pornog-
raphy are viewing hard-core child pornography. Moreover, if
eighty percent of the images are of prepubescent children, there
can be few legitimate 'Claims that a possessor was unaware he
was viewing a child.35
The National Center for Missing artd Exploited Children
has explained the effects of child pornography on its victims.
Because children are sexually abused in the creation of the por-
nographic images, they can incur physical injuries such as geni-
tal bruising, cuts, lacerations and sexually transmitted
diseases.36 The children may suffer psychological injuries in-
cluding depression, anger, withdrawal, low self-esteem and feel-
ings of worthlessness. These feelings may be expressed in
flash-backs, nightmares and other indicia of post-traumatic
stress syndrome.37 They often engage in self-destructive behav-
ior including substance abuse, prostitution, depression and
suicide."8
When the pornographic images are viewed by others, the
children depicted are victimized once again. The mere knowl-
edge that images exist and are being circulated causes shame,
humiliation and powerlessness."9 This victimization lasts for-
ever since the pictures can resurface at any time,'o and this cir-
culation has grown exponentially because of the Internet.4 ! As
33. ld. at vii.
34. ld.
35. In United States v. X-citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64 (1994), the Su-
preme Court ruled that section 2252 requires knowledge that pornographic images
portrayed minors. This case involved a 17-year old who was a pornography star.
It led Congress to impose stringent record-keeping and labeling requirements on
producers of adult pornography to ensure that minors are not used in their
productions.
36. Eva J. Klain, et aI., Child Pornography: The Criminal-Justice-System-Re-
sponse, NAT'L CTR. FOR MISSING & ExPLOITED CHILDREN, March, 2001, at 10, avail-
able at http://www.missingkids.com/eu_US/publicationsfNC81.pdf.
37. ld.
38. ld. at 1-11.
39. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 249 (2001).
40. Wolak et al., supra note 32, at II.
41. See Hearing on Internet Child Pornography Before the Subcomm. on
Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security arthe H. Comm. on the Judiciary, l07th
Congo 6 (2002) (testi,m0ny of Michael J. Heimbach, Unit Chief, Crimes Against
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one expert explained: "The victim's knowledge of publication of
the visual material increases the emotional and psychic harm
suffered by the child."42 At a more fundamental level, child por-
nography victims' rights of privacy and human dignity are vio-
lated when their images are circulated and viewed by others.43
The possessor thus has real victims and inflicts actual harm
upon them by his conduct.
Moreover, there is growing evidffilce linking the possession
of child pornography with acts of sexual violence against chil-
dren. A recent study by psychologists at the Federal Bureau of
Prisons found that eighty-five percent of individuals charged
with possessing child pornography admitted that they also sex-
ually abused children.44 The study's results were so shocking
that the Bureau of Prisons ordered the paper containing the re-
sults of the survey be withdrawn from publication pending fur-
ther ·investigation. Earlier studies placed the percentage of
child pornography possessors who had also molested or at-
tempted to molest children at sixty-five percent.45 Thus, not
only do the images themselves victimize the children they por-
tray, but the linkage between possession and molestation may
be even greater than previously thought.
Even with the real harm inflicted by child pornography, the
outrage it triggers in most arenas has failed to reach adequately
into the ring of possessors. The next section traces the develop-
ment of child pornography laws to help explain why this percep-
tion may have developed.
Children Unit, Federal Burean of Investigation), available at http://www.fbi.gov/
congress/congress02/heimbach050102.htm; Janis Wolak et al., Internet Sex Crimes
Against Minors: The Response ofLaw Enforcement, NAT'L GTR. FOR MISSING & Ex-
PLOITED CHILDREN, Nov., 2003, available at http:www.ncmec.org/eu_US/publica-
tionsINC132.pdf.
42. T. Christopher Donnelly, Protection ofChildren from Use in Pornography:
Toward Constitutional and Enforceable Legislation, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 295,
301 (1979) (interview with child psychiatrist) (quoted in United States v. Pugh,
515 F.3d 1179, 1196 n.ll (11th Cir. 2008)).
43. The issue of a child's right not to be depicted in pornography demands an
in-depth treatment that I will address in a future article.
44. The study was conducted at the Federal Correctional Institution in
Butner, N.C. of 155 male inmates serving sentences for possession or distribution
of child pornography. Benedict Carey & Julian Sher, Debate on Child Pornogra-
phy's Link to Molesting, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2007, available at http://www.ny
times.com/2007/07/19/us/19sex.html?_r=2&oref=slogin&oref=slogin.
45. See Wolak et al., supra note 32.
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III. Reasons for the Faulty Perception That Possession of
Child Pornography is a Victimless Crime
A. The Dual Rationale of Child Pornography Laws
A trilogy46 of Supreme Court cases established the two ra-
tionales of child pornagraphy laws: (1) to punish for the harm
inflicted by the production, distribution and possession of child
pornography and (2) to protect against future harm that may
occur if child pornography is not stamped out. Lower courts that
fail to recognize adequately the actual harm aspect of the laws
foster the view that possession is a victimless crime. This sec-
tion provides a brief history of child pornography laws to under-
stand their dual rationale.
Following an increased public awareness of the scourge of
child pornography in the late 1970s, Congress passed the Pro-
tecting of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977.47
The Act barred the use of a minor to engage in sexually explicit
conduct for the purpose of producing a visual image of such con-
duct with the knowledge that that it would be transported in
interstate or foreign commerce.48 An important limitation of
this early federal legislation was that it applied only to child
pornography that was obscene and used for commercial
purposes.
During this same time period, states were also enacting
their own bans on child pornography.49 In contrast to early fed-
erallegislation, some states outlawed the production and distri-
bution of child pornography without requiring that it be
obscene. New York was one such state and the challenge to its
statute led to the 1982 landmark ruling in New York v. Ferber,60
where the United States Supreme Court ruled that child por-
nography was not protected by the First Amendment even if it
46. Ashcroft v. The Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002); Osbonrne v.
Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1989); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982). On May 19,
2008, the Snpreme Court decided that speech that pandered or solicited child por-
nography fell outside First Amendment protection because of the potential harm it
created. United States v. Williams, 128 S.Ct. 1830 (2008).
47. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2253 (1978). See generally AM'y GEN. COMM. ON POR-
NOGRAPHY, FINAL REP' l 408w 415 (1986); Klain, supra note 36, at 12.
48. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2253 (1978).
49. See Amy Adler, Inverting the First Amendment, 149 U: PA. L. REV. 921,
928-29 (2001).
50. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
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was not obscene. In carving out a new category of unprotected
speech, the Supreme Court reasoned that the "use of children as
subjects of pornographic materials is harmful to the physiologi-
cal, emotional, and mental health of the child."5! It stressed
that child pornography was "intrinsically related to the sexual
abuse of children in at least two ways." First, the materials pro-
duced are a permanent record of the children's participation
and the harm to the child is exacerbated by their circulation.52
Second, the distribution network for child pornography needed
to be closed to control the production of child pornography.53
Thus, the Ferber Court highlighted both the actual and
threatened harm to children inherent in the production and dis-
tribution of child pornography as necessitating its criminaliza-
tion. 54 Following Ferber, in 1984 Congress amended the
original federal child pornography legislation to remove the ob-
scenity and commercial purpose requirements.55 Some states
were enacting legislation that banned possessing and viewing
child pornography even though the Supreme Court had ruled in
Stanley v. Georgia that possession of obscene materials was pro-
tected by the First Amendment.56
51. Id. at 758.
52. One could say that the actual harm is inflicted in two ways: the abuse to
the victim in its creation and the injury to the victim by publication of the images.
53. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 759.
54. In addition to the reasons stated above, the Court added three more rea-
sons for excluding child pornography from First Amendment protection. As part of
the need to stop the child porn industry,. the Ferber Court reasoned further that
the First Amendment does not protect speech that is "an integral part of criminal
activity," as is "the advertising and selling of child pornography." [d. at 761. In
addition, it noted that "any material of value that would be prohibited under the
category of child pornography is "exceedingly modest, if not de minimis." ld. at
762-63. Finally, it stated that precedent allows for a content-based restriction on
First Amendment protections. ld. at 763-64. See Adler, supra note 49.
55. Child Protection Act of 1984,18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2253 (1984). The prodnc-
tion of child pornography was so clandestine that between 1978 and 1984 only one
person was convicted for producing child pornography under the 1977 Act. See
ATI"Y GEN. COMM. ON PORNOGRAPHY, FINAL REP., supra note 47, at 604-05. Thus,
the need to stop the flow of child pornography became the better route for
prosecutors.
56. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). The Stanley Court reasoned
that prohibiting the possession of obscene materials in one's home was inimical to
the very premise of the First Amendment's protection against state interference
with what a person thinks, reads or views in the privacy of his home. It specifi-
cally rejected the state's claim that it had a legitimate interest in banning the
possession of obscene material because it may lead to sexual violence. The Stanley
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Constitutional challenges to possession statutes provided
the next opportunity for the Supreme Court to reaffirm the dual
rationale of child pornography legislation. In Osborne v. Ohio,57
the Court ruled that the mere possession or viewing of child
pornography victimized children and could be prohibited. In
distinguishing Stanley; the Osborne Court stated that the ban
on possessing or viewing child pornography was enacted "to pro-
tect the victims of child pornography; it hopes to destroy a mar-
ket for the exploitative use of children."58 This one sentence
with its two independent clauses exemplifies the dual rationale
of child pornography laws.
On the actual harm to children, the Osborne Court reiter-
ated Ferber's rationale by stating that "materials produced by
child pornographers permanently record the victim's abuse."59
It noted further that the "pornography's continued existence
causes the child victims continuing harm by haunting the chil-
dren in years to come."60 On the threatened harm, the Osborne
Court explained that possessing child pornography is harmful
because the possessor might "use child pornography to seduce
other children into sexual activity."6! In addition, banning pos-
session will protect future victims of child pornography by dry-
ing up the market for it. The Court noted that since Ferber,
much of the child pornography market was driven under-
ground, making it much more difficult to attack by punishing
only its production and distribution.62 Thus, Osborne recog-
nized the need to ban the possession or viewing of child pornog-
raphy. Congress shortly followed suit and passed the Child
Court stated that not only was there no empirical evidence that supported the
State's claim, but that crime-prevention is better served by "education and punish-
ment for violations of the law" than by criminalizing anticipatory conduct. ld. at
566-67. The Stanley Court also rejected the State's contention that criminalizing
possession was needed to support the state's ban on the distribution of obscene
materials, reasoning that this need did not justify a ban on what a person read or
viewed in his home.
57. 495 U.S. 103 (1989).
58. [d. at 109.
59. [d. at 111.
60. [d.
61. [d.
62. [d. at 110-11.
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Protection Restoration and Penalties Enhancement Act of 1990
that banned the possession of child pornography.63
The advent of computer technology and the Internet led to
Congressional concerns that existing legislation was out of date.
In 1996, Congress passed the Child Pornography Prevention
Act that expanded the definition of child pornography to cover
computer-generated images.64 In 2002, the Supreme Court once
again focused on the actual and future harm to children in rul-
ing that Congress could not outlaw virtual pornography. In
Ashcroft v. The Free Speech Coalition,65 the Court reaffirmed
Ferber's central premise that "[wJhere the images are them-
selves the product of child sexual abuse, ... the State can ban
them."66 It elaborated on Ferber's rationale that child pornogra-
phy actually harms children when it is circulated. It explained
that "[!]ike a defamatory statement, each new publication of the
speech would cause new injury to the child's reputation and
emotional well-being."67 As to the ban on possessing child por-
nography, the Ashcroft Court stressed that its ruling in Osborne
"anchored its holding in the concern for the participants, those
whom it called the 'victims of child pornography."'68 Because no
child is abused when a person creates, distributes or possesses
virtual pornography, the Ashcroft Court ruled that it was pro-
tected speech under the First Amendment.
As to the future harm aspect of child pornography laws,
Ashcroft once again reiterated that drying up the market for
child pornography and stopping possessors from using the
images to groom future victims were compelling state inter-
63. 18 UB.C. § 2252 (1996). The legi8lation banned the possession of three or
more images of child pornography. ld. Subsequent legislation banned possessing
any images, but created an affirmative defense for those who possessed less than
three images and took steps to destroy the images and reported them to the au-
thorities. 18 UB.C. § 2252A(5)(d) (1996). Unlike the Ohio statnte at issue in Os-
borne, the federal legislation did not include an explicit ban on the viewing of child
pornography. Courts are increasingly grappling with the significance of the OIniS-
sian. See Ty E. Howard, Don't Cache Out Your Case: Prosecuting Pornography Pos-
session Laws Based on Images Located in Temporary Cache Files, 19 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1227 (2004).
64. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A (1996).
65. 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
66. [d. at 249 (citing New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 761 n.12 (1982)).
67. [d. (citing Ferber, 458 UB. at 759).
68. [d. at 250 (quoting Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 110 (1990)).
2008] CHILD PORNOGRAPHY'S FORGOTTEN VICTIMS 859
ests.69 Nevertheless, the Ashcroft Court ruled that the risk that
the virtual pornography may be used to seduce a child was too
attenuated from actual harm to be punishable.70 The key dis-
tinguishing factor to the Ashcroft Court was the lack of an ac-
tual victim.
These cases rest' on two grounds: actual and threatened
harm to children. This dual rationale applies to all aspects of
child pornography laws, including bans on possessing child por-
nography. With the Internet's ability to republish an image of
child pornography around the world in seconds, the harm to the
children depicted is magnified immensely. The possessor of the
image inflicts actual harm when he views the image. He also
threatens harm to other children. However, this threatened
harm is only part of the rationale for its ban. Thus, there
should be no doubt that possession of child pornography is not a
victimless crime. Yet, this erroneous perception endures. An-
other possible explanation for this flawed view may stern from
scholarly criticisms of possessory offenses in general. The next
section explores this criticism and demonstrates why such criti-
cism should not apply to possession of child pornography.
B. Scholarly Criticism of Possession Offenses
Many scholars view possession offenses as anticipatory of-
fenses that punish preemptively for the threat of harm, rather
than the infliction of harm.71 Some see them as an unwar-
ranted and dangerous expansion of the criminal law. Theyar-
gue that possession offenses are part of a larger war on crime
that grants law enforcement overly broad powers to preemp-
tively incapacitate undesirable members ofsociety.72 One of the
69. Id. at 249-50 ("While the Government asserts that the images can lead to
actual instances of child abuse, the causal link is contingent and indirect. The
harm does not necessarily follow from the speech, but depends upon some unquan-
tified potential for subsequent criminal acts."),
70. [d. at 250.
71. See, e.g., JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAw 93 (2001);
MARKus DIRK DUBBER, VICTIMS IN THE WAR ON CRIME: THE USE AND ABUSE OF
VICTIMS' RIGHTS (2002) [hereinafter DUBBER, VICITIMS IN THE WAR]; GEORGE P.
FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAw 198-202 (1978) [hereinafter FLETCHER, RE-
THINKING]; Douglas Husak, The Nature and Justifiability of Nonconsummate Of-
fenses, 37 ARIz. L. REV. 151 (1995).
72. See, e.g., DUBBER, VICTIMS IN THE WAR, supra note 71; Francisco Mtmoz-
Conde & Luis Chiesa, The Act Requirements as a Basic Concept of Criminal Law,
leading critics of possession offenses, Professor Markus Dubber,
argues that possession offenses "do the crime war's dirty work"
because they are sweeping offenses, easy to detect and easy to
prove, with a disproportionate impact on poor, urban minori-
ties.73 Classifying possession as a status crime, Professor Dub-
ber contends that possession offenses have replaced the now-
discredited vagrancy laws for law enforcement to stop, search
and incapacitate as a "mass policing tool of choice."74
Professor Dubber characterizes possession offenses as vic-
timless because they punish only the threat ofharm. For exam-
ple, he states that gun possession is a victimless crime because
having a gun does not harm anyone unless it is used.75 In fact,
according to Professor Dubber, "The only personal victim of a
possession offense is the person doing the possessing because he
is unable to enjoy the possessed."76 Other scholars similarly
treat possession offenses as victimless. 77
Whether the criticism of most possession offenses is well-
deserved is outside the scope of this paper. The problem is that
scholars have not explicitly carved out possession of child por-
nography from their opprobrium. Professor Dubber includes
the possession of obscene materials depicting sexual perform-
ances by a child in his recitation78 of the many possession of-
fenses legislatures have enacted as part of their war on crime.79
Other scholars have repeated this inclusion.8o For example,
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28 CARDOZO L. REv. 2461. 2477 (2007) ("[MJere possession ofa potentially danger-
ous object is not noxious per se.").
73. Markus Dubber, Policing Possession: The War on Crime and the End of
Criminal Law. 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 829. 831, 931 (2001) [hereinafter
Dubber, Policing Possession].
74. Markus Dubber, Punishment, Morality, and the State: Legitimating Penal
Law, 28 CARDOZO L. REY. 2597, 2605 (2007).
75. Dubber, Policing Possession, supra note 73, at 936.
76. ld.; DUBBER, VICTIMS IN THE WAR, supra .note 71, at 32-33.
77. See supra notes 71 & 72.
78. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 263.11 (McKinney 2000).
79. Dubber, Policing Possession, supra note 73, at 936.
80. JOlIN KAPLAN ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 112 (2004).
Professor Fletcher criticizes offenses that criminalize possession of obscene materi~
als without distinguishing between those depicting adults and not children. See
GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW § 3.4 (Oxford Univ. Press 2000)
(1978) lliereinafier FLETCHER, RETHINKING]. See also Douglas Husak, Rethinking
the Act Requirement, 28 CARDOZO L. REv. 2437, 2438 (2007) (referencing Professor
Dubber's list of N.Y. possession offenses).
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Professor Douglas Husak reiterates Professor Dubber's list of
possession offenses as evidence of the over-criminalization of
the law.8! Yet, Professor Husak identifies an anticipatory of-
fense as one that fails to "cause . . . harm on each and every
occasion in which it is performed."82 Under his definition, pos-
session of child pornography is clearly more than an anticipa-
tory possession offense.83 Accordingly, possession of child
pornography should be explicitly excluded from Professor
Husak's criticism.
Professor George Fletcher also expresses concern with pos-
session offenses. In his view, the main problem with possession
offenses is overbreadth.84 He distinguishes between possession
offenses that manifest danger to the community and those that
do not. In the first category he places drug, weapons and ob-
scenity offenses because there does not appear to be an innocent
purpose 'in having them and thus, the mere fact of having them
"raises sinister implications."85 In the second category he places
offenses such as possession of burglary tools that are dangerous
only because the state has outlawed them.86 According to Pro-
fessor Fletcher, the latter category of malum prohibitum of-
fenses are a questionable use of police power, whereas the
former may be appropriate.
Yet, Professor Fletcher treats both categories as victimless
offenses based upon the notion that they represent only a threat
of harm. He states that guns, drugs or obscene materials are
"not likely to be used for innocent purposes."87 However, they
are only a threat offuture harm. Without expressly carving out
possession of child pornography from even these more accept-
able possession offenses, the perception remains that it, too, is a
81. Husak, supra note 71, at 154, 162-63, 179.
82. Id. at 158.
83. In contrast, consider drug possession offenses. It may not be a victimless
crime because people may have been forced to smuggle the drugs that are ulti-
mately possessed. Yet there could be situations where this is not the case, and
therefore, under Professor Husak's definition, it is a non-consummate crime. In
contrast, inherent in the possession of child pornography is the victimization of the
child depicted.
84. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, THE GRAMMAR OF CRIMINAL LAw 295 (2007);
FLETCHER, RETHINKING, supra note 80, at 198-205.
85. FLETCHER, RETHINKING, supra note 80, at 200-05.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 200.
victimless offense. In fact, even if the child pornography is not
used at all beyond merely possessing it, the possessor has
harmed the depicted child.
The failure to carve out child pornography from other pos-
session offenses may be intentional because, as discussed previ-
ously, possession of child pornography is, in part, an
anticipatory offense. This is so since the possessor could use the
images to seduce other children 'by de-sensitizing them, or the
images could so inflame the possessor that he goes out and sex-
ually abuses a child. Yet, whether intentional or not, scholars
have not focused sufficiently on the ways in which possession of
child pornography is a possessory offense that inflicts, not only
risks, but actual harm to victims.ss As previously explained, the
possessor causes actual harm because re-publication inflicts
shame and humiliation upon the child depicted. This psycho-
logical damage can lead to anti-social, destructive and depres-
sive behavior. The circulation over the Internet to innumerable
individuals who receive, possess and view the images causes the
victims to suffer further in the knowledge that the images are
forever in cyberspace, able to resurface at any time.
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C. The Unreal World of Cyberspace
The explosive growth of the Internet has created confusion
and tension between what is real and what is fiction. Because
of its anonymity, the Internet allows people to reinvent them-
selves. They may say they are single on an online dating ser-
vice when they are in fact married. They may say they are
teenagers when they are adults on a social network. They may
claim to be one person when they are someone else and engag-
ing in identity theft. They may claim they are merely role-play-
ing when they are engaged in online chats with undercover
agents who themselves are posing as children.s9
88. Prof. Husak characterizes most possession offenses as nonconsummate,
carving Qut one example-possession of radioactive material, as a consummate of~
rense because it is harmful regardless of its use. See Husak, supra note 71. at 169
n.78.
89. This "fantasy" defense has been used successfully at least once to defeat
an Internet sting charge. See Audrey Rogers, New Technologies, Old Defenses: Iii-
ternet Sting Operations and Attempt Liability, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 477, 508-09
(2004).
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Some of the lies are innocuous, while others are criminal.
Yet, all have led to some sense that nothing is real in cyber-
space. Thus, as the attorney representing one defendant
charged with possessing child pornography asserted: "[I1f the
anonymous interaction with a far away internet wasn't possi-
ble, [the possession] may never have happened."90 Some schol-
ars agree, arguing that cyber-space itself is encouraging
criminal behavior.9! In other words, thElse individuals would
not have gone out and sought child pornography, but when they
can easily access images from their homes, they are somehow
lured into doing so. Ifthis phenomenon is true, it calls for more,
not less, vigilance in tracking down and prosecuting possessors
of child pornography so that the public is educated about the
victims of child pornography and the criminal nature of surfing
the Internet.
IV. Conclusion
Possession of child pornography is a crime with actual vic-
tims. Judges, scholars and the general public need to treat it as
such. If we focus on the harm inflicted to a child when an image
of him being sexually abused is possessed and viewed, we can
help dispel misperceptions that possession is a victimless crime.
90. United States v. Goff, 501 F.3d 250 (3d Cir. 2007).
91. See Christina Demetriou & Andrew Silke, A Criminological Internet
"Sting": Experimental Evidence ofIllegal and Deviant Visits to a Website Trap, 43
BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 213 (2003), cited in ORIN S. KERR, COMPUTER CRIME LAW
268-69 (2006).
